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Axel Ockenfles
answers a few questions about this month's new hot paper in
field of Economics & Business.
From
•>>March 2000
Field: Economics & Business
Article Title: "ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition"
Authors: Bolton, GE;Ockenfels, A
Journal: AMER ECON REV
Volume: 90
Page: 166-193
Year: MAR 2000
* Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business, 310 Beam, University
Pk, PA 16802 USA.
* Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business, University Pk, PA 16802 USA.
* Univ Magdeburg, Fac Econ & Management, D-39016
Magdeburg, Germany.
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Why
do you think your paper is highly cited?
Based on a simple
fairness principle, we developed a model that organized a large and
seemingly disparate set of behavioral patterns observed in
experimental economics and psychology laboratories all over the world.
At the same time, our model yielded a fresh and challenging view on
traditional approaches to decision making in social interaction. So
the paper touches what is at the heart of many economists' and, more
generally, social scientists' interests.
Does
it describe a new discovery or new methodology that's useful to
others?
Since the model can be applied to all kinds of games, even
games with incomplete information, it points to new and innovative
empirical tests, the data from which then provides the grist for
refining the existing model, or creating entirely new ones.
Is
it a condensation of previous literature on the subject?
The paper identified a common link among a wide variety of
experiments, and therefore presented a consistent map of previously
observed economic behavior.
Could
you summarize the significance of your paper in layman's terms?
The
various areas of inquiry that constitute experimental economics and
psychology appear at times to be surveying distinct and isolated
regions of behavior. What we see in experiments involving market
institutions is usually consistent with standard notions of
'competitive' self-interest. Other types of experiments appear to
foster sharply different conduct. 'Equity' has emerged as an
important factor in bargaining games. 'Reciprocity,' of a type that
differs from the standard strategic conception, is often cited to
explain behavior in games such as the prisoner’s dilemma. There is
substantial controversy about what, if anything, connects these
observations. Our model is based on the premise that people behave
strategically and that they are motivated by both their pecuniary
payoff and (unlike in traditional economic approaches) their
relative payoff standing. It demonstrates that the interplay of
individual motives and strategic interaction may yield competitive,
fair or reciprocal behavior depending on the institutional
environment. Seemingly disparate behaviors can be traced back to a
simple common principle.
Axel Ockenfels
Researcher
Max-Planck-Institute for Research into Economic Systems
Strategic Interaction Group
Kahlaische Straße 10
D-07745 Jena
Germany
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ESI Special Topics, March
2002
Citing URL - http://www.esi-topics.com/nhp/comments/march-02- AxelOckenfels.html
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